


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*Coord. w/ IAC
Agencies*

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, First Floor, Administration Building

on Friday, 18 August 1950, at 1000 hours

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence
Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Lieut. Colonel Thomas J. Grant, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy
Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Magee, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William C. Truheart, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton Howze, Department of the Army
Colonel Charles V. Brunley, Department of the Army
Lieut. Colonel Arthur G. Kiel, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Mr. H. H. Strickland, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Central Intelligence Agency
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SECRETMINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 18 August 1950

1. There was no formal agenda for this meeting.
1. THE SUPPORT OF THE NIS PROGRAM BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
 2. THE DCI opened the meeting by mentioning the recent suspension of support for the NIS program by the military intelligence agencies on account of the Korean emergency. He asked that everyone concerned do what he could to facilitate NIS production.
 3. GENERAL BOLLING said that as soon as he found the Army was not meeting its commitments he had the matter investigated and discovered that the trouble lay in the fact that the Engineers and the Transportation Corps had been forced by the emergency to pull everyone off the NIS. The Army was now confronted by the proposition of getting additional personnel, but had not made much progress in solving the problem.
 4. ADMIRAL JOHNSON said he was aware that the Navy had not kept up with its commitments, but thought that the current increase in the personnel available to him would enable the Navy to do better in the future.
 5. GENERAL BOLLING suggested that it would be helpful if there were some way to earmark funds and personnel of the Army technical services for NIS purposes. They could be earmarked in such a way that they could not be used for other purposes.
 6. GENERAL MEGEE seconded General Bolling's suggestion.
 7. ADMIRAL JOHNSON also had a suggestion. He thought that if the editing of NIS drafts were a little less meticulous, the production of the NIS could be expedited considerably. Since the NIS reports were to be kept under continuous review after publication for maintenance purposes, corrections for small grammatical errors and the like could be published as part of subsequent revisions. He added that it might be advisable to ask the JCS to re-examine NIS production priorities.
 8. THE DCI was doubtful if the JCS should be asked to re-examine NIS priorities, because they had already cut the annual production rate in half.

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9. ADMIRAL JOHNSON and GENERAL MEGGIE explained that the JCS might desire to rearrange the priorities without further reduction in the production rate.

10. ADMIRAL JOHNSON, by way of describing a method that might be applied generally, said the Navy was using the NIS format in preparing relevant papers so that they could be fitted into the appropriate NIS report. The idea was to save effort and time.

11. GENERAL BOLLING returned to his suggestion that funds and personnel be earmarked for NIS production. He thought that the funds should be used to set up civilian personnel, not officers, within 3-2, so that the technical services could not divert them to non-intelligence work. He wished to know if CIA could furnish funds to be used to procure and employ personnel in this way.

12. THE DCI countered by asking if the Army could not get a share of the increase in the Defense budget, GENERAL BOLLING's reply being that an attempt had proved this to be impossible.

13. ADMIRAL JOHNSON asked about the CIA arrangement to furnish funds for State Department NIS production, THE DCI's reply being that the arrangement could not be extended to other departments during the current fiscal year.

14. General discussion followed, after which THE DCI suggested that he write a letter to the Secretary of Defense supporting General Bolling's idea.

15. There was further discussion, after which THE DCI repeated his proposal that he write the Secretary of Defense.

16. MR. ARMSTRONG stated that he wished to compliment the NIS coordinator on the annual report, since it was a very good job.

17. Action: All agreed that the DCI should write the Secretary of Defense, suggesting that funds and personnel be earmarked for the NIS production of the Department of Defense, and that such funds and personnel should not be diverted to other purposes.

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II. OBTAINING FROM HICOG THE REPORTS SUBMITTED BY GERMAN SCIENTISTS UNDER CONTROL LAW NO. 21

18. THE DCI mentioned this item, which had been brought up at the last meeting of the IAC, saying that he thought the matter was settled and asking Mr. Armstrong if he wished to give a report.

19. MR. ARMSTRONG requested Mr. Trusheart to give a report.

20. MR. TRUSHEART discussed briefly what had transpired, and stated that a conclusion had been reached. A statement had been received from HICOG to the effect that the Military Security Board of his office would henceforth furnish to the Defense and other intelligence agencies such reports as they requested, including all reports submitted to the Scientific Research Division, MSS, by German scientists. Implementation was proceeding.

21. Some general discussion followed.

22. Action: The IAC took note of the statement by Mr. Trusheart.

III. ACTIVITY OF THE ISBRANDTSEN LINE

23. ADMIRAL JOHNSON mentioned that he was very disturbed about the activities of the Isbrandtsen Line in delivering critical materials to Communist China. The United States was in a bad position in approaching the British on similar matters when our own record was not clean.

24. There was general discussion of the matter.

25. Action: No action was taken.

26. The meeting adjourned at 1030 hours.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	AD/ORE	ITZ	31 Aug
2	S/PP	CON	5 Sept
3	D/NIS	MAN	5 Sept
4	AD/ORE		
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CHIEF, COAPS	PC	29 Aug
2			
3			

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<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS: